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WEIGHING PROSECUTORIAL POWER AND 
DISCRETION:  FIXING THE IMBALANCE 
 
ARBITRARY JUSTICE:  THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR.  By Angela J. Davis.   
Oxford University Press.  2008.  Pp. 264. 
Reviewed by Harvey Gee* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It might sound cliché, but some legal commentators contend that 
prosecutors—the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system—
too often seek convictions instead of justice.1  Commentators argue that 
prosecutors pay more attention to their cases involving educated and 
upper-income victims, and put more work into them, than cases where 
the victims are poor and uneducated.2  Not surprisingly, lenient plea 
bargains are more available to wealthy defendants than to indigent 
defendants.3  Angela J. Davis, a Professor of Law at American University 
Washington College of Law, expands on this premise in her timely and 
well-written book, Arbitrary Justice:  The Power of the American Prosecutor 
[Arbitrary Justice].  In Arbitrary Justice, Professor Davis examines the 
growing power of prosecutors, from mandatory minimum sentencing 
laws that enhance prosecutorial control over the outcome of cases to the 
increasing politicization of prosecutors’ offices.  Professor Davis knows 
her subject well.  She gained a tremendous amount of trial experience 
and practical knowledge as a public defender and agency director at the 
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia [PDS], one of the 
leading indigent defense offices in the country. 
Part II of this Book Review discusses the role of prosecutors in the 
American criminal justice system.  Next, Part III expands the issue of 
criminal administration beyond the traditional black-and-white racial 
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1 ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:  THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 4 
(2007). 
2 Id. at 5. 
3 Id. 
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scheme.  Part IV describes Professor Davis’s proposals for reform.  
Finally, this Book Review concludes with a reminder that criminal justice 
remains a complex topic for all Americans. 
II.  PROSECUTORS, POWER, AND JUSTICE 
At the outset, Arbitrary Justice offers an illuminating look at the 
prosecutor’s role in the criminal justice system.  Professor Davis argues 
that the most serious system-wide issue is the lack of accountability for 
the daily decisions of prosecutors.4  According to Professor Davis, 
prosecutors hold vast power because they are largely under-regulated.  
She contends that the criminal justice system gives prosecutors a pass by 
allowing them to circumvent scrutiny and accountability, which affords 
them more power than any other government official.5  “Because 
prosecutors make these decisions in private without meaningful 
supervision or accountability, they are rarely punished when they 
engage in misconduct.”6  In fact, Professor Davis asserts that prosecutors 
are often rewarded with promotion and career advancement as long as 
their conviction rates remain high.7  The author emphasizes that the time 
has come to focus on prosecutors, require more information from them, 
and institute fundamental reforms that result in more fairness in the 
performance of the prosecutorial function.8 
Professor Davis further argues that a prosecutor’s legal 
responsibility is not just to represent the state in seeking convictions, but 
is to pursue justice.  In her work as a public defender, Professor Davis 
noticed that prosecutors held and dealt almost all of the playing cards.  
In her time with the Public Defender’s Office, Professor Davis found that 
prosecutors were the most powerful officials in the criminal justice 
system.9  Professor Davis states that the routine, everyday decisions of 
prosecutors control the direction and outcome of criminal cases and 
cause more serious consequences for criminal defendants.10  She 
contends that the most remarkable feature of these important, sometimes 
life-and-death decisions is that they are totally discretionary and 
virtually unreviewable.11  Even more remarkable is that prosecutors 
                                                 
4 Id. at 15–17. 
5 Id. at 18. 
6 Id. at 140. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 18. 
9 Id. at 5. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 15–17. 
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make the most important of these discretionary decisions behind closed 
doors and answer only to other prosecutors.12 
There have been high-profile cases involving the abuse of 
prosecutorial power.  For example, after the release of Arbitrary Justice, 
there was the prosecution of former Senator Ted Stevens on corruption 
charges.  After Senator Stevens was convicted, United States District 
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan dismissed seven counts regarding Stevens’s 
lying about the receipt of $250,000 in gifts and free renovations to his 
Alaska house.  Judge Sullivan then appointed an outside lawyer to 
investigate allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, including the 
mishandling of evidence and witnesses.13  Apparently, federal 
prosecutors failed to provide the defense with notes that contradicted 
key government witnesses.14  Judge Sullivan remarked that “[i]n 25 years 
on the bench, I have never seen anything approaching the mishandling 
and misconduct that I have seen in this case.”15 
In her book, Professor Davis provides the example of the Duke 
Lacrosse Team rape case.16  In that case, two African American strippers 
were sent by an escort service to the home of one of the captains of the 
Duke Lacrosse Team.17  One of the strippers claimed that several white 
members of the Duke Lacrosse Team raped and assaulted her.  Michael 
Nifong was the Durham County District Attorney who led the 
prosecution of the Duke Lacrosse players.18  According to Professor 
Davis, racial and economic dynamics motivated Nifong’s decision to 
charge the Duke Lacrosse players.19  Professor Davis explains that racial 
animus was apparent because Nifong’s supporters were primarily 
African Americans who rallied around the alleged victim.20  On the other 
hand, the white defendants were represented by a high-priced defense 
attorney.21  At the time of the prosecution, critics claimed Nifong was 
pandering to his constituents because he was up for re-election.22  
Nevertheless, the three Duke Lacrosse players battled the phony gang-
rape allegations for thirteen months before the North Carolina Attorney 
                                                 
12 Id.  
13 See Del Quentin Wilber, Judge Orders Probe of Attorneys in Stevens Case, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 8, 2009, at A1. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 196–98; see also Duff Wilson, Ethics Hearing For Duke 
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A14. 
17 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 196. 
18 Id. at 196–97; Wilson, supra note 16, at A14.  
19 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 197. 
20 See id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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General declared them innocent and dropped the charges against them.23  
Ultimately, Nifong was found guilty of misconduct in the criminal case 
against the Duke Lacrosse players, stripped of his law license, and 
ousted from office.24 
In another example, Professor Davis claims that the prosecution in 
the Jena Six cases was racially motivated.25  She argues that Louisiana 
prosecutor Reed Walters engaged in race-based selective prosecution in 
response to a series of confrontations between African American and 
white students at predominately-white Jena High School.26  Professor 
Davis emphatically claims that “[a]lthough a number of white and black 
students engaged in assaultive behavior, Walters charged only one white 
student with a minor misdemeanor while charging a group of black 
students with serious adult felonies for engaging in a very similar 
behavior.”27 
Given the racial reality of the American criminal justice system, 
Professor Davis advocates for racial disparity studies designed to reveal 
racially discriminating treatment.  Such studies should be published and 
widely available to the public.28  As a result, prosecutors could 
acknowledge the importance of racial disparity to the electorate.29  The 
proposed studies would assist in determining whether defendants of 
color receive harsher treatment for the same criminal behavior as whites 
and whether some cases are prosecuted more vigorously than others 
depending on the racial backgrounds of the defendant and the victim.30 
Demonstrating its comprehensiveness, Arbitrary Justice also discusses 
prosecutorial discretion in capital punishment cases.  Professor Davis 
cautions that the arbitrariness of the decision to charge the death penalty 
is troubling.  She asserts that “the death penalty decision is far too 
arbitrary, often depending on the philosophy and proclivities of the chief 
prosecutor instead of on legal principles, standards, or guidelines.”31  
Professor Davis also notes that the decision to seek the death penalty is 
often based on politics.32  According to Davis, the chief prosecutor is 
                                                 
23 Wilson, supra note 16, at A14. 
24 Id. 
25 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 199–201. 
26 Id. at 199. 
27 Id. at 200. 
28 See id. at 186–89. 
29 Id. at 186–87. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 89. 
32 Id. 
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concerned about re-election; thus, his or her decisions are heavily 
influenced by their potential political consequences.33 
III.  AMERICAN JUSTICE IS NOT ALL BLACK, WHITE, AND BROWN 
Professor Davis notes that studies, such as Professor David Baldus’s, 
illustrate that there are sentencing disparities between African 
Americans, Hispanics, and whites.34  Throughout Arbitrary Justice, 
Professor Davis holds the reader’s attention because she uses specific, 
compelling stories of individuals from her prior cases to reveal the unfair 
and unequal treatment of both defendants and victims.35  As a public 
defender, Professor Davis saw disparities in the way prosecutors 
handled individual cases.  Cases involving educated, wealthy victims 
took priority over cases involving poorer, uneducated victims.36  From 
her perspective, the few white defendants represented by her office 
sometimes appeared to receive preferential treatment from prosecutors.37  
Although Professor Davis never saw evidence of intentional 
discrimination based on race or class, the consideration of such factors in 
the prosecutorial process often produced disparate results along class 
and racial lines.38  But intentional discrimination is not always necessary 
to create racial injustice, and prosecutors are not the only individuals 
who contribute to shocking consequences.  Here, a broader perspective is 
possible. 
For instance, Professor Viet Dinh asserts that race relations in the 
context of criminal justice have never been a strictly black-and-white 
conflict, although many legal scholars tend to frame it as such.39  
Professor Dinh advocates for analyses of the criminal justice system to 
reflect the multiracial reality of American life.  The application of 
Professor Dinh’s notion to Arbitrary Justice reveals that Professor Davis 
tends to write about justice administration in Washington, D.C. as 
existing in a black-and-white paradigm.  Thus, the analysis in Arbitrary 
Justice should be extended beyond the Beltway to show that criminal 
justice may be evaluated in a multiracial context. 
Furthermore, Asian Americans are often overlooked in 
conversations about race and crime.  In fact, Asian Americans represent 
                                                 
33 Id. at 91. 
34 Id. at 82–84. 
35 See generally id. 
36 Id. at 37–39. 
37 Id. 
38 See generally Wilson, supra note 16, at A14. 
39 See Viet Dinh, Races, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1998) (book 
review of Randall Kennedy’s Race, Crime, and the Law (1997)). 
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one of the fastest growing segments of the prison population.  The model 
minority stereotype of Asian Americans as one monolithic ethnic group 
that has achieved success though education and hard work without the 
assistance of governmental benefits is one possible explanation for the 
lack of attention given to Asian-American crime.  The model minority 
myth has created a stereotype of Asian Americans.40  Such a myth is 
disingenuous, however, and masks the reality that Asian Americans are 
still affected by discrimination and are involved in the criminal justice 
system.41 
Five years ago, the U.S. District Court in San Francisco considered a 
prisoner’s claim of discrimination stemming from a thirty-six-year 
absence of minorities serving as grand jury forepersons.  Although the 
court in Chin v. Runnels ultimately denied the claim, the court noted the 
subjectivity involved in the judge’s selection of grand jury forepersons 
and the possibility of bias.42  In Chin, the defendant filed a habeas 
petition claiming that his right to equal protection was violated because 
Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans, and Hispanic Americans were 
excluded from service as forepersons on the grand jury that indicted 
him.43  The defendant relied on statistical evidence to demonstrate that 
from 1960 to 1996, the grand jury forepersons selected in San Francisco 
were underrepresented with respect to three minority groups:  Chinese, 
Filipino, and Hispanics.  There were no forepersons chosen from these 
groups between 1960 and 1966.44 
Yet, as the defendant emphasized, during this time period the 
composition of the grand jury pools from which grand jury forepersons 
were chosen consisted of:  13.4 percent Chinese Americans; 6.9 percent 
Hispanic Americans; and 4.0 percent Filipino American.45  The defendant 
relied on expert opinion that reflected there was a 0.0003 percent chance 
that no individuals from the three groups would be chosen to serve as 
foreperson.46  “[D]uring the same period there were Chinese-American 
and Filipino-American grand jurors who had comparable age, education 
and occupational characteristics to the individuals selected [to be 
                                                 
40 See FRANK H. WU, YELLOW:  RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 42 (2002); 
Gabriel J. Chin, et. al, Beyond Self-Interest:  Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community of 
Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129, 149 (1996); Sumi K. 
Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment:  Where the Model Minority Meets 
Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 185 (1997). 
41 See Jerry Kang, Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1926, 1931 
(1993). 
42  343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
43 Id. at 892. 
44 Id. at 895. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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foreperson].”47  The defendant further alleged that while the number of 
African Americans and female forepersons increased, there was no 
increase in forepersons of Chinese or Hispanic descent.48  He based his 
prima facie case of discrimination on the fact that Chinese Americans 
were a legally recognized class and his undisputed statistics showed that 
“no Chinese-Americans had served as grand jury foreperson over a 36-
year period, even though they represented 13.4% of the pool of grand 
jurors from which the foreperson was chosen.”49 
Ultimately, United States District Judge Charles Breyer found that 
the narrow scope of habeas review prevented the court from reviewing 
the issues de novo.  As a result, the court could not take “a closer 
inquiry—particularly as to the possibility that the selection process could 
have been subject to unconscious bias.”50  Judge Breyer concluded that 
the constraints of habeas review prevented the court from finding the 
state court’s evidentiary findings objectively unreasonable.51 
In addition, in Chin’s state court appeal, the Superior Court’s 
executive director and assistant district attorney testified that race did 
not factor into the selection process.  Instead, according to their 
testimony, the presiding judges applied race-neutral criteria looking for 
members with “‘leadership’ experience, ‘people skills,’ and the capacity 
to motivate others to work together.”52 
However, Judge Breyer observed that “unconscious stereotyping or 
biases may have contributed to the exclusion of these groups 
notwithstanding the best of intentions of those involved.”53  He 
remarked that the qualities of leadership and people skills were 
subjective judgments that involved “subtle and unconscious mental 
processes susceptible to bias.”54  Moreover, a member of the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, who echoed Judge Breyer’s 
opinion, noted “the cultural bias of selecting officials and all the 
stereotypical misconceptions, the fears, myths and stereotypes about the 
leadership skills of Asian[]Americans,” and suggested that more 
research needed to be done on the issue of why Asian Americans are not 
able to break into management levels and are not viewed as leaders.55 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 895–96. 
49 Id. at 901 
50 Id. at 903. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 905. 
53 Id. at 906. 
54 Id. 
55 Transcript of July 22, 2008 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Meeting, 
Issues Facing Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPIs) in the Federal Workplace and 
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Judge Breyer cited to critical race theory scholarship that addressed 
the pervasiveness of unconscious racial stereotyping and bias.56  The first 
citation was to Professor Charles Lawrence’s pioneering article, The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.57  
Professor Lawrence asserts that unconscious racial motivation influences 
the behavior that produces racial discrimination and that it is impractical 
to require conscious or intentional motivation in a wrongdoer’s mind.58  
Consequently, Lawrence concluded that because of the ubiquity of racist 
beliefs and the fact that people are not even conscious that they hold 
those beliefs, a motive-centered doctrine of racial discrimination creates 
a heavy burden of persuasion.59  Lawrence further articulates a critique 
of the Intent Doctrine, which he considered outdated and ineffective.60  
These facts have long been overlooked by the courts; the harms of racial 
bias and inequality exist whether or not decision-makers act with clear 
racial animus.61   
Essentially, under this theory of stereotyping, individuals who 
believe all Asian Americans are highly skilled at mathematics, non-
assertive, and quiet, will continue to hold this belief whenever they 
encounter Asian Americans, even if it is not true.  In Chin, Judge Breyer 
also referred to the state court transcripts of a superior court 
administrator who testified that, based on his twenty years of experience, 
judges selected the foreperson after an off-record in-chambers discussion 
with him or with the deputy assistant attorney who served as an 
advisor.62  The administrator stated that a foreperson must get along 
with others when conducting a meeting and must be able to manage a 
jury.63  Likewise, the deputy district attorney, who was a grand jury 
advisor, testified that judges seek forepersons who were good leaders, 
strong motivators, and possessed effective administrative skills.64  While 
Judge Breyer analyzed the unconscious bias that has played a role in 
contemporary discrimination against Asian Americans, this unconscious 
                                                                                                             
Compliance Manual Chapter on Religious Discrimination at 14, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
abouteeoc/meetings/7-22-08/transcript.html. 
56 Chin, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 906. 
57 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
58 Id. at 321. 
59 Id. at 319. 
60 Id.  
61 See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2005). 
62 Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
63 Id.at 896. 
64 Id. 
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bias is ultimately difficult to prove, and under traditional equal 
protection laws, it has been allowed to exist unchallenged. 
Significantly, Judge Breyer closes his opinion with a four-paragraph 
exploration of the model minority myth and negative stereotyping of 
Asian Americans.  Perhaps Judge Breyer was very cognizant of the 
model minority myth because he worked in San Francisco, a city with a 
large Asian community, with Judge Edward Chen, who is the first and 
only Asian American on the federal bench for the Northern District of 
California.65  Whatever his influences may have been, Judge Breyer’s 
discussion sets forth three related points about Asian American 
stereotypes that can be affected by unconscious bias:  (1) Asian 
Americans have been described as “nonassertive and deferential, 
intelligent but devious, and mathematically and technically oriented 
rather than verbally skilled[]”; (2) Asian Americans are not perceived to 
be compatible in managerial and executive roles or as lawyers because 
they lack leadership skills; and (3) Asian Americans “are often perceived 
as quiet and unassuming.”66 
In comparison, based on the reviewer’s personal experiences as a 
public defender, during jury selection, aside from the jury questionnaires 
and questions posed to potential jurors, very little is known about jurors.  
It is quite plausible that attorney and judge may fall into a comfortable 
tendency to base their judgments on racial or cultural stereotypes, unless 
challenged.  Judges must select a jury foreperson in a matter of minutes.  
As discussed in Chin, perhaps San Francisco judges gave undue 
deference to certain racial stereotypes.  San Francisco is such a diverse, 
multicultural city; it is surprising that there has never been an Asian 
American jury foreperson.  Rather, the exclusion of Chinese Americans 
from serving as grand jury forepersons is likely evidence of an 
unconscious racial intent.  The absence of an Asian American foreperson 
in San Francisco should be as glaring as if there was never an African 
American foreperson in Washington, D.C. or if a Hispanic had never 
been appointed as foreperson in San Antonio.  But, unfortunately, as 
discussed by Judge Breyer in Chin, discrimination against Asian 
Americans often goes unnoticed. 
IV.  MODERATE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Unlike other commentators, Professor Davis not only focuses on the 
problems, but she also offers a sensible agenda for comprehensive 
                                                 
65 See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 
1109 (2003). 
66 Chin, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 907–08. 
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review and reform.  Arbitrary Justice challenges the legal community and 
concerned citizens to pursue and enact meaningful standards of conduct 
and effective methods of accountability to help prosecutors serve their 
communities and the interests of justice.  Professor Davis’s suggestions 
include:  (1) having national, state, and local bar associations conduct in-
depth investigations to determine the adequacy of current prosecutorial 
misconduct controls and possible reforms; (2) improving the plea 
bargaining process by requiring prosecutors to prove all of the relevant 
information, which would enable the defendant to make an informed 
decision, require prosecutors to reveal the weaknesses in their case, and 
inform the defendant of information that is helpful to the defense; and 
(3) creating accountability through transparency to improve the 
prosecutor’s troubling role in the implementation of the death penalty.67 
While Professor Davis’s reforms are modest, it is still unlikely that 
any substantial cultural reform in the federal, state, and local 
prosecutorial systems will occur quickly.  As the Author has personally 
witnessed as a public defender, and from what Arbitrary Justice shows, 
the American criminal justice system is highly complex. 
The last two years have produced a rise in the rate of violent crime in 
large American cities.  Simultaneously, the national rate of incarceration 
is continuing to rise at an unprecedented rate.  This dramatic observation 
is produced by such factors as:  changing crime rates, strict sentencing, 
politics, culture, and demographics.  There is no consensus on these new 
realities; however, sentencing laws and increased incarceration are often 
referred to as the solution to address increasing crime rates.  A reliance 
on this approach imposes a heavy burden on courts and communities, 
but only marginally impacts crime.  The racial divide in crime and 
punishment in America is also exacerbated by unequal treatment in 
sentencing.  But there is room for optimism.  President Barack Obama 
recognizes our criminal justice system needs reform.  If President Obama 
follows through with his campaign promises, he will work to:  (1) 
eliminate sentencing disparities; (2) sign legislation banning racial 
profiling by federal law enforcement agencies; and (3) reduce crime and 
recidivism by providing ex-offender support.  Such priorities represent 
an effort to restore and advance our nation’s commitment to equal 
justice.68 
                                                 
67 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 180. 
68 barackobama.com, Organizing for America, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ 
civil_rights/index_campaign.php#racial-profiling (last visited  Oct. 6, 2009). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, Arbitrary Justice offers strong support for the proposition that 
criminal justice cannot be equally divided between good guys and bad 
guys or between justice and injustice.  Rather, criminal justice and racial 
justice are complex subjects each deserving of deeper consideration.  A 
closer and more meaningful examination of the continually evolving 
criminal justice system would uncover the real reasons for crime, which 
would assist policymakers in developing pragmatic measures to address 
the present day realities of crime and punishment. 
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